In the ever-present fight against poverty, governments are in constant need of effective and efficient policy instruments. Typically, poverty is addressed by tax-based systems of social grants. However, due to financial constraints, instruments that seek to involve the private sector gain more and more attention. Creating such synergies is particularly important for developing countries. In this context, South Africa has implemented and further developed a system of preferential procurement. While the 'traditional' focus of public procurement is 'value for money', procurement policies increasingly pursue other goals, such as social or environmental ones. In South Africa, one of the award criteria is the tenderer's B-BBEE status. In doing so, public procurement in South Africa also aims at redressing past inequalities. Moreover, it is perceived as a valuable instrument in the fight against poverty. This article tries to develop an analytical framework in which the effectiveness and efficiency of the South African system of preferential procurement can be assessed. The argumentation builds on two hypotheses: First, the South African system of preferential procurement pursues two different goals: the promotion of equality and the alleviation of poverty. Second, preferential procurement is ineffective with regards to both these goals. Thus the focus lies not on the viability of horizontal policies in general but on horizontal policies for particular purposes. Furthermore, the article takes into account both the economic perspective as well as the normative perspective. There are several factors that cause doubts whether preferential procurement in South Africa effectively addresses poverty issues. Consequently, if we are to justify preferential procurement, we need to adopt a normative view and focus on the concept of substantive equality. Unlike social grants, preferential procurement is capable of promoting the participative dimension of equality -an important aspect of the transformational process in South Africa.
inequalities resulting from apartheid. The second goal is the alleviation of poverty.
(2) Understood this way, preferential procurement is, due to systemic flaws, ineffective in pursuing the goal of poverty-alleviation. Furthermore, it also struggles to promote equality.
This way, the focus is not horizontal policies in general, but horizontal policies for particular purposes, i.e. the alleviation of poverty and promotion of equality. The effectiveness and efficiency of the current South African approach will be examined.
3 Structure, scope and research methodology
The first step in order to examine the propositions mentioned above will be to look at the purposes of procurement law and the role of general policy objectives in this context.
Building on this, general criticism on such horizontal policies will be described. In order to do so, it is sensible to look at the European Union law, a system of procurement law which is traditionally cautious when it comes to horizontal policies. This cautious European approach will be contrasted with the general acceptance of horizontal procurement, especially those dealing with apartheid-caused inequalities, in South African law.
Building on this foundation, the text will then address the distinction of different goals as mentioned in the first proposition, i.e. reducing inequalities caused by apartheid and alleviating poverty. Especially this second goal is not obvious and worth a closer look. After having established what pursuing each of those goals really means, the text will seek to evaluate whether preferential procurement can be an effective tool to promote equality and to alleviate poverty in South Africa and thus try to comment on the second proposition.
Aside from a brief description of the South African legal context of preferential procurement, the focus will only be on more general thoughts on the principle of preferential procurement and not its detailed implementation. It however has to be noted that the implementation of the horizontal policy does affect the policy's impact. 15 The approach adopted in this text is one that tries to formulate statements on the purposes of preferential procurement and their respective practical relevance. Given the general lack in empirical research on the impact of horizontal policies, 16 a more detailed discussion of implementation methods would exceed the scope of this text.
Purposes of public procurement law
At first, it is necessary to describe the different purposes of procurement law. In this context it will then be possible to evaluate common criticism and objections against horizontal policies.
1 'Traditional' purposes of procurement law
Public procurement traditionally is regulated by a set of rules in order to promote costeffectiveness. In this regard, it could be argued that the goal of public procurement law is "best value for money" 17 This traditional 18 purpose is also reflected in the General Procurement Guidelines issued by the National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa which list "Value for Money" as the first pillar in the five-pillar-model of public procurement.
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Closely related to this 'best value' approach is another traditional purpose of procurement law -to regulate competition among tenders. 20 In a free-or social-market economy it can be assumed that competition among tenders ultimately leads to a lower price for the purchased good as the tenders, in order to be awarded the contract, are interested in offering the needed goods for the cheapest possible price. The General Procurement
Guidelines in South Africa thus list "Open and Effective Competition" as the second pillar of procurement.
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16 See on this 4 1 2. 17 Mille 2006:489; Arrowsmith 2010 :150 speaks of "obtaining goods [...] on the best terms". 18 In line with Arrowsmith I will avoid the term 'primary' as it implies an unjustified illegitimacy of, then 'secondary', horizontal policies, Arrowsmith 2010:150; slightly different Bolton 2006:193: "aims which are, arguably, secondary to the primary aim of procurement".
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Horizontal policies
However, the purposes of public procurement law do not end here. It has already been mentioned that public procurement commonly is used for a variety of policies. 22 In South Africa, this use is explicitly promoted in section 217 (2) and (3) of the Constitution.
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According to these provisions, public procurement policy can 24 contain "categories of preference in the allocation of contracts" 25 as well as "[protect or advance] persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination" 26 . Section 217 (3) of the Constitution then requires the state to take legislative measures in order to promote these goals. These measures are contained in the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act.
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Such policies go beyond ensuring the acquisition of goods "on the best terms". 28 Regarding only the acquired goods and comparing them to their price, the state has no advantage in buying from persons who have been discriminated against during apartheid. Neither are the goods necessarily cheaper nor necessarily of better quality. Thus such policy as contained in section 217 (2) of the Constitution and the PPPFA cannot be justified by traditional purposes of public procurement law.
1 Policies linked to the contract
Especially in European Union law the requirement of a link between the policy and the "subject-matter of the contract" 29 has been well established as a requirement for the validity of horizontal policies. 30 This is understandable when the purpose of procurement law to regulate competition among tenders 31 is taken into account. Equal competition which 22 Arrowsmith 2010:149; examples for policies that go beyond pure cost-effectiveness are rules that order a contracting company to adhere to certain labour standards, 153, or environmental standards, Lukosiuniene & Lukosiunas 2014:175. 23 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ("the Constitution"); There has been and still is uncertainty on the requirements of a sufficient link between policy and contract. This issue will be addressed again in the context of horizontal policies in European Union law. 34 For now it is sufficient to recognize that there are policies that are linked to the content of the contract and that they, at least in European Union law, can be justified more easily in the system of public procurement law.
Policies with no or only a remote link to the contract
Policies which are not sufficiently linked to the contract pose more challenges to their justification in the procurement system. They can distort competition between tenderers and thus potentially be more detrimental to traditional purposes of procurement law than horizontal policies which have a close link to the contract and the purchased goods.
Arrowsmith speaks of three "key distinctions" of horizontal policies. 35 The issue of a sufficient connection to the contract is reflected in her second distinction, i.e. "policies concerned only with performance of the contract". 36 With regard to preferential procurement in South Africa based on grounds of race there will hardly be a link to the contents of the contract. The fact whether a tenderer belongs to a historically disadvantaged group of persons or not has no connection to the contents of the procurement contract. In this context another aspect is relevant: In addition to
Arrowsmith's three distinctions a fourth one can be made. Policies which connect the award of a contract to requirements that can be influenced by the tenderer and policies that use criteria which cannot be influenced by the tenderer. There is a difference in legitimacy between having a tenderer obey certain labour standards such as minimum wages and preferentially awarding contracts on grounds of race or gender. One of the more convincing aspects of criticism is that horizontal policies can be detrimental to traditional purposes of procurement law. In order to ensure cost-effectiveness and 'best value for money', procurement law needs a formal, rigid and transparent regulatory mechanism, which is softened by criteria such as preference because of race. 49 This argument is closely linked to the more general argument of horizontal policies being costly.
The softer procurement regulations get, the more the goal of cost-effectiveness is endangered. While the state will indeed gain something in exchange for the additional costs,
i.e. positive effects on matters of public interest, the comparison with traditional purposes of procurement law raises the question whether procurement law is the correct field to pursue such policies.
With regard to preferential procurement in South Africa the argument that horizontal policies can be discriminatory to certain groups obviously is relevant and thus has to be addressed. However, considering that preferential procurement is a form of affirmative action, the argument brought forward with regard to horizontal policies does not seem to add many new aspects to the discussion already revolving around affirmative action measures. It therefore will be referred to the existing criticism.
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1 European Union law
As one of the main fields of public procurement law, the position in European Union law is worth a look. It is to be evaluated what can be taken from the general position on horizontal policies in European procurement law.
In line with the history of the European Union as a free-market instrument and a general hesitation of European Union law with regard to social matters, social policies in public procurement were dealt with only in recent years. 51 This also meant that the approach to horizontal policies in procurement law in the European Union traditionally was rather restrictive. The idea underlying this change is to combat fronting, corruption and fraud 85 by removing any discretion previously awarded to authorities in terms of the preference point system.
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Being historically disadvantaged is therefore no longer a criterion for preferential treatment; 87 two of the criteria for the B-BBEE status however are "ownership" and "management control". 88 The purpose of addressing past unfair discrimination is still apparent. 
Conclusion
Especially considering the evolution in modern European Union procurement law, it can be stated that the principle of horizontal policies in procurement has gained significant support and should be seen as accepted in European Union law, 90 a system which traditionally has been hesitant with regard to social policies. 91 In this light, general criticism on horizontal policies and a retreat to 'pure' procurement law focusing only on 'best value for money'
does not seem to further the understanding of either procurement law or social law. 92 Thus the focus of the discussion should not be whether horizontal policies in procurement are viable at all, but rather to what extent, under which circumstances and for which goals. This leads to one of the main issues of this paper: The acceptance of the general principle does not necessarily imply the acceptance of a particular type of horizontal policy. Each policy has to be looked at individually and examined with regard to its viability in the procurement law context.
Goals of "horizontal policies" 93 in South Africa
Criticism on horizontal policies in procurement can roughly be divided into two categories:
firstly, the policy is ineffective in achieving the desired outcome, i.e. the result is not good enough. 94 Secondly, the policy is inefficient in achieving the desired outcome, i.e. it may reach its targets, but the costs are too high.
95 90 Lukosiuniene & Lukosiunas 2014:180 expect even further acceptance for social an environmental values in EU procurement law in the future. 91 The exact boundaries of horizontal policies in European law however still need to be evaluated. This is especially relevant for the issue of a sufficient link to the subject-matter of the contract. 92 On that matter it seems worth noting that, at least in a comparative perspective, social policies in public procurement law form a type of social law; on the definition of social law in the comparative The first step in assessing preferential procurement policies necessarily has to be a clear description of the objectives that should be achieved by social horizontal policies. If the effectiveness and efficiency of social policies in public procurement are to be evaluated, a common framework needs to be reached. This includes a description of potential objectives as precisely as possible. It has to be noted that such a description and separation of goals is often hard to reach as goals are intertwined and often co-dependent.
The two goals most prominent in the discussion, and the sole focus of this paper, are the promotion of equality and the alleviation of poverty. While both issues are often, albeit not necessarily, related, 99 it is important to distinguish. The reason for this is the character of affirmative action measures in general. Katiyatiya concludes that affirmative action measures in general are not "originally designed specifically to benefit the poor" 100 and that "affirmative action has limited utility, and that it is by no means the principal mechanism through which wealth is redistributed or poverty reduced". 101 This characterization of affirmative action measures cannot be overstated. It is furthermore backed by section 9 of the Constitution which lists affirmative action measures under the headline "Equality".
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The Constitution provides that in order " [t] o promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken". Development Programme refers to the alleviation of poverty. 110 Literature in large extent adopted this view. Besides the promotion or maintenance of equality, it has been submitted that preferential procurement can also provide an instrument to alleviate poverty. 111 The relationship between preferential procurement, the promotion of equality and the alleviation of poverty however is complex and requires closer examination.
1 1 Aspects of poverty
When trying to assess the -potential -impact of preferential procurement on poverty, it is necessary to determine the content and understanding of poverty. It is no surprise that this definition is anything but straightforward. The concepts to describe poverty vary, according to Sen from a "capability-based approach" 112 where poverty is seen as the incapability to "reach certain minimally acceptable levels", 113 to approaches which focus more on utility or low income. 114 Poverty measurement, which looks solely on the income of persons, suffers from the flaw that persons may have different capabilities to transfer income into desired achievements because of for example "social, economic, or physical constraints as well as due to political interference". 115 This is what Sen labels the "capability-based approach". The first important distinction is the one between the concepts of absolute and relative poverty. While there are several aspects in the measurement of poverty which can be labelled as absolute or relative, 117 it can be summarized that an absolute approach defines poverty using a basket-model determining the amount of money needed to acquire a certain minimum of necessities. 118 In contrast, a relative approach of poverty measurement defines the poverty line compared to the population's income, i.e. as a certain portion of for It further has to be noted that poverty-alleviation of course is not the only, arguably not even the main objective of horizontal policies; see for example Bolton & Quinot 2011:49 This sets the framework for the further inquiry. In this part, the material aspects of poverty alleviation will be discussed. Firstly, it will be briefly outlined why the South African law of preferential procurement -in its current form -theoretically could be capable of addressing material aspects of poverty. Then it will be discussed whether such poverty-alleviation through preferential procurement is effective. The immaterial, relative, and more equalityoriented aspects of poverty will then be discussed in the following part labelled "Equalityoriented aspects". The interdependencies between poverty and equality as well as the fact that both aspects are deeply intertwined need to be acknowledged. Any too strict separation in terms of distinct goals would be merely artificial. At the same time, it is important to understand both poverty and equality as two separate aspects of one social problem. Thus for the remainder of the text I will refer to the more material and absolute aspects as poverty-alleviation and the more immaterial and relative aspects as equality. 130 Inequality plays an important role in the measurement of poverty in the sense of the composition of 'the poor'. Given a specific poverty line the distance of an individual to that poverty line is crucial, Sen 1992:102. This aspect of inequality among the group of 'the poor' will not be dealt with in this text. It is however acknowledged that the composition of the group of people beneath the specified poverty line is crucial when measuring poverty and looking for effective policy instruments to alleviate poverty. 131 The conclusion is twofold: first, studies concerning the United States and South Africa bring up mixed results. While some studies suggest positive effects of preferential procurement policies on minority-owned business, others suggest no effect at all. Second, the studies do not explicitly investigate the effect of preferential procurement on poverty-alleviation.
It is not the purpose of this paper to take part in the economic discussion about effects of preferential procurement. In the light of the outlined studies, only a few remarks will be i.e. sufficient taxes, in order to grant substantial social welfare aid in South Africa, such policy recommendations would be useless. Poverty alleviation through preferential procurement has to be seen in this context. Linking the large amount of procurement spending -which have to be spent anyway -to social goals is sensible and the notion is that social goals such as poverty-alleviation could be achieved more cheaply. The question which has to be asked in this context is whether money that is rare anyways, should be spent on the more effective policy instrument of social grants -considering the costs of preferential procurement.
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2 Equality-oriented aspects
All the problems mentioned above combined with the general acknowledgment that affirmative action measures in general are not the main instrument for the redistribution of wealth, 214 arguably lead to the conclusion that in terms of poverty-alleviation, preferential procurement is significantly less effective than tax-based social grants. The question arising is whether preferential procurement -contrary to the general South African perceptionshould be abandoned. When trying to answer this question it is however important to acknowledge a second dimension of preferential procurement besides the alleviation of Applying the upper poverty line, poverty decease was reported within the third income quintile from 100 % to 97.4 % and in the fourth income quintile, i.e. the 'last' quintile to contain technically poor persons, from 41. poverty: the equality-oriented dimension. The social problem -as described -contains not only material aspects. The immaterial aspects are deeply linked to the issue of equality.
Preferential procurement addresses these equality-oriented aspects. 215 Aside from more pragmatic considerations, such as the limited financial potential of tax-based redistribution in the South African economy, the equality-oriented perspective provides for a normative view. When assessing the feasibility of preferential procurement, both perspectives, the economically influenced pragmatic and the equality-oriented normative perspective, have to be taken into account. In this regard, it is to be assumed that mere negative antidiscrimination law does not suffice to eradicate inequalities. 216 In South Africa this approach stands on relatively solid ground as both sections 9 (2) and 217 (2) of the South African
Constitution provide for positive measures in promoting equality.
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2 1 Equality in the South African Constitution
Section 217 of the Constitution is the central provision concerning procurement. Section 217 (1) states, among others, that the procurement system must be fair and equitable. This way section 217 (1) already promotes procedural equality, i.e. everyone involved in the process needs to be treated equally. 218 The South African Constitution takes this one significant step further. It entrenches the idea of substantive equality. 219 This idea is reflected in section 217 (2) of the Constitution which allows for preferential treatment. The constitutional framework for preferential procurement as an equality-oriented policy however does not end at section 217. It is influenced by the general constitutional equality clause in section 9 and has to be seen in this bigger context of transformation. 220 In this 215 On the categorization of policy instruments from their target see Graser 2013 . Within this framework of equality-oriented policies preferential procurement can be evaluated, Graser 2013:2. For the purpose of this paper it will however be sufficient to identify the specific equality-oriented purpose of preferential procurement. Further categorization will not be discussed. context, the principle of equality plays an important role. 221 While there is no commonly accepted definition of transformation, 222 Langa points to the Epilogue of the interim Constitution which characterises the Constitution as -
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"a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex".
Transformation thus describes a process of change driven by certain values. It is a "social and economic revolution". 224 Preferential procurement has to be viewed in this broader picture. Furthermore it is important to note the different possible scopes of transformation.
These will be briefly addressed below.
2 2 Dimensions of equality
Equality as a principle has several, often contradictory, dimensions. 225 Thus promoting equality in one dimension can very well lead to more inequality in another dimension.
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This also means that when assessing whether a certain policy instrument is implemented to promote equality, the social context -or the specific dimension -in which equality should be achieved needs to be defined. 227 Fredman identifies four goals of substantive equality:
"[f]irst, it aims to break the cycle of disadvantage associated with status or out-groups. This reflects the redistributive dimension of equality. Secondly, it aims to promote respect for dignity and worth, thereby redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation, and violence because of membership of an identity group. This reflects a recognition dimension. Thirdly, it should not exact conformity as a price of equality. Instead, it should accommodate difference and aim to achieve structural change. Preferential procurement addresses this dimension of equality. During apartheid, oppressed groups of society were denied from participation, both in general society and the economy. 233 Contracts with the state were a privilege for large companies which were mostly owned by whites. 234 This left black-owned businesses and black economic activity to marginalisation. 235 Preferential procurement can provide historically disadvantaged persons the opportunities to follow their economic choices. After such deep inequalities during the apartheid system, providing for formally equal opportunities alone was not enough. Given the unequal status under the apartheid system which resulted in both social and economic inequalities, the idea of preferential procurement might promote substantive equality in the field of government contracts where a purely cost-oriented approach would prove insufficient. 
Difficulties
Referring to the equality-oriented dimension of preferential procurement of course is not the 'holy grail' in the discussion surrounding preferential procurement. Horizontal policies in procurement which are understood as instruments to alleviate poverty suffer from the problems as described above -preferential procurement to promote substantive equality also has to be viewed cautiously. In this context it can be referred to the general discussion surrounding BEE or B-BBEE measures in South Africa.
1 The broader context: Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa
Preferential procurement is part of the Black Economic Empowerment policy (BEE).
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Within the transformation of South-Africa's post-apartheid society, black economic 243 Of course preferential procurement -compared to welfare grants -is not the only instrument capable of providing equality. In fact, social welfare grants as arguably the main instrument of wealth-redistribution are the traditional instruments to promote equality. It does however contribute to a different dimension of equality than preferential procurement with its aspect of social and economic inclusion. 244 Leibbrandt et al 2010:67. 245 See Sen 1992 :95. 246 Sekgaphane 2009 Bolton & Quinot 2011:275. empowerment -as a policy instrument -plays an important role. 247 The issue has been discussed and criticised rather vividly. For the purpose of this text, one of the major aspects of criticism will be focused on. After having firstly been installed as "Black Economic Empowerment" (BEE), the policy has then quickly been reformed to "Broad Based Black
Economic Empowerment" (B-BBEE) which reflects one of the major points of criticism. As very often with affirmative action measures, B-BBEE has to deal with the accusation of producing only an elite of beneficiaries while the, more broad, problems are not tackled -or not tackled sufficiently. As will be shown, this line of criticism is particularly relevant to the procurement-related aspects of B-BBEE.
1 1 Purposes of BEE and B-BBEE
The B-BBEE Act 248 defines its objectives as - (e) promoting investment programmes that lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in the economy by black people in order to achieve sustainable development and general prosperity; 247 Patel & Graham 2012:193. 254 The phrase "Black Diamonds" is common. It is however somewhat problematic because of its reference to race, Chevalier 2011:9. It is also not popular among the black middle class, 9. Descriptive on the criticism on B-BBEE only benefitting elites Patel & Graham 2012 :193. 255 Kovacevic 2007 6. 257 Patel & Graham 2012:201. 258 201-202 figure 2. 259 201. 260 Kovacevic 2007:6. Another approach mentioned by Katiytiya is the one of 'creamy layers' as used in India, Katiyatiya 2014:175, 241 . The idea is to ensure that privileged parts of designated groups are not eligible for preferential treatment, 175. This could address the problem of elitism caused by affirmative action. Elitebuilding through affirmative action is a major concern. Applied to preferential procurement, the elite-building in fact is inherent in the procurement system and -to some extent -desired. As long as public procurement moreover already been mentioned with regard to the effectiveness of preferential procurement policy in the fight against poverty. It has been seen that the vast majority of total contract value is awarded to larger enterprises with small and medium businesses at the brink of exclusion.
2 Preferential procurement: desired elite-building?
This line of criticism, that affirmative action measures do not reach those who need it the most, can be applied to preferential procurement. An important factor for the choice of the successful tenderer is their "capability/ability [...] to execute the contract". 261 According to
Bolton, "relevant factors [to determine the capability/ability] include financial and economic standing; experience and track record; and the nature, quality, and reliability of products or services to be rendered". 262 More factors "that would generally play a role in the determination of qualification or responsibility" 263 are "the nature, quality and reliability of the product or service to be rendered; the experience and track record of a contractor; the possession of appropriate licenses and permits; the ability of a contractor to comply with the delivery schedule; the contractor's record of business ethics and integrity; the technical knowledge and capacity of a contractor; the availability of tools or equipment for the contractor's use; and the financial and economic standing of a contractor". 264 All these criteria favour established and proven tenderers. As far as 'negative' criteria are concerned, it is important to notice that contractors may be excluded if they failed to satisfactorily provide goods or services in an earlier contract. 265 The -correct -assumption is that failure heavily relies on cost-effectiveness as its main purpose and, linked to that, the qualification of a tenderer as the main award criterion, 'creamy layers' are entirely foreign to the procurement system; see on this 5 2. Penfold & Reyburn 2014:25-1. 270 In this regard it has to be noted that contradicting goals in public procurement are common, Kattel & Lember 2010:383 . However, in the case of preferential procurement as a means to promote substantive equality, the main purpose of procurement, cost-effectiveness, reinforces the common criticism of affirmative action as benefitting only a small elite. This leads to the question whether preferential procurement is, systemically, the appropriate instrument to promote substantive equality in this sense.
of preferential procurement policies on their effect on poverty, we would most likely have to argue to abolish the policies in favour of broader and more effective social grants. Then the costs-affiliated with preferential procurement would be better used financing social grants.
Especially 271 in South Africa preferential procurement however needs to serve the purpose of promoting substantive equality. Transformation of society also calls for participative equality of formerly economically marginalised groups. It is not sufficient to try to achieve transformation only in the broader scope through welfare grants. It is acknowledged that preferential procurement in this regard is also problematic, as due to its main objective of cost-effectiveness suffers to an even larger degree from the criticism of leading to elites. It does however, as the study by Letchmiah has shown, lead to more participation of business owned by historically disadvantaged persons in general. Understood this way, preferential procurement can be a legitimate policy in South Africa. The necessity of both other, more broad-based equality-oriented measures and especially social grants to alleviate poverty however shifts the focus on the costs side of preferential procurement policies. Within the transformative policy system in South Africa, preferential procurement has its place. Not to alleviate poverty, but to provide substantive participative equality.
4 Costs of preferential procurement
The need of additional social grants however calls for a cautious monitoring of costs of preferential procurement. The following paragraphs will not seek to present a solution to this problem but only make a few remarks on the significance of costs.
"Even where benefits can be achieved, these must be weighed against the cost of doing so through procurement, either in terms of a price premium or a compromise on other matters such as time or quality". 272 Preferential procurement, while an intriguing instrument in countries with little financial capabilities, still comes with costs. According to Watermeyer's statement cited above, these costs are mainly constituted by either a "price premium", i.e.
higher prices of tenders or lower quality of service delivery. In general it can be assumed 271 But certainly not exclusively. 272 Watermeyer 2003:13. that fewer tenderers due to less competition lead to higher prices. 273 This however is not cast in stone as, depending on the implementation, horizontal policies may in fact decrease the price.
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According to the scope of this text, a study assessing the costs of the South African system of preferential procurement de lege lata will briefly be outlined. 275 Furthermore, even if price premiums had to be paid, these came with a benefit. Such increased prices should be regarded as costs for the promotion of social goals 281 which the state is obliged to promote anyways.
Conclusion
The look at the South African system of preferential procurement has shown a strong acceptance for the principle. Given the fact that one of the main purposes is to address past discrimination, this degree of acceptance is hardly surprising. Furthermore, even in the traditionally sceptical European procurement system the acceptance for horizontal policies is on the rise. This indicates that the discussion should no longer be about whether horizontal policies in principle are a viable instrument but more which particular policy for which particular purpose should be implemented. South African procurement law uses 273 Quinot 2013:377. 274 377-378, referring for example to increased competition in the long run due to better access to the market for more tenderers, 378. 275 It has to be noted that it is important to take the issue of costs into account when thinking about procurement alternatives de lege ferenda. 276 preferential procurement in order to reduce inequalities and alleviate poverty. The first initial proposition was that these two issues constituted two distinctly different goals. This proposition held only partially true. Poverty and equality are co-dependent and deeply interlinked. Any too strict separation therefore would be artificial. It however has to be acknowledged that, while they both concern the same social problem, they are two different aspects of this problem. Thus some differentiation is necessary and possible.
With regard to the second proposition the effectiveness of preferential procurement in South Africa, de lege lata, is hard to evaluate. This is mostly due to a lack of dedicated empirical research on the impact of preferential procurement on poverty. In citing some studies dealing with affirmative action in general and the impact of preferential procurement on targeted businesses it however can be concluded that there remain doubts about the plausibility of the use of preferential procurement in the fight against poverty. In this regard it is highly likely that social grants prove to be the more effective measure.
The comparison with social grants however points to another purpose of preferential procurement -the promotion of substantive equality in the form of participative equality. 282 Transformation undoubtedly is both an important process as well as an important goal in South Africa. The issue of preferential procurement raises the question of the correct scope of transformation. Should we look at distinct fields such as the economyor even more narrow: specific types of economy? Or is transformation to be a broader concept, affecting the society as a whole? Narrow transformation by means of preferential procurement can address the aspect of social and economic inclusion which is inherent in substantive equality as contained in section 9 of the Constitution. Broader transformation in the sense of an effective fight against poverty could likely be better achieved by strengthening social grants. Ultimately it comes down to defining the desired outcome of the transformational process. Not least the constitutional equality clause points to a society in which social and economic participation are crucial. Preferential procurement candespite all the problems such as elite-building -serve this purpose. Preferential procurement has shown to significantly involve formerly marginalised businesses. Its likely ineffectiveness in the fight against poverty needs to be addressed by additional social 282 And to some extent redistributive equality.
